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EMPLOYERS BEWARE: SOUTH CAROLINA'S
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL

EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE IS LIKELY TO KEEP
EXPANDING*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The public policy exception, which gives an employee a cause ofaction in
tort for violations of public policy, continues to erode the at-will employment
doctrine in South Carolina. While the courts emphasize that the at-will
employment doctrine is still alive and well, a number of recent decisions
collectively exhibit an attitude toward broadening the scope of the public policy
exception. Such an expansion restricts the permissible bases upon which
employers may discharge their employees. This attitude may mean that
plaintiffs will have increasingly more opportunities to sue their employers in
tort for wrongful discharge and to get their claims to a jury. Accordingly, this
seemingly pro-plaintiff attitude should have employers on the lookout when
firing, because there are more at-will employment situations imposing liability.
Part II of this Note deals with the historical development of employment
at-will and its common law exceptions. Part III focuses on the background of
South Carolina's public policy exception. Finally, Part IV discusses recent
developments in South Carolina's public policy exception and displays the
courts' current attitude toward broadening the exception.
II. HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS

A. History ofEmployment At-Will
Legal authorities credit Horace Wood with first recognizing the
employment at-will doctrine in his 1877 master and servant treatise.' He
asserted the American rule as follows:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite
hiring is primafaciea hiring at will, and if the servant seeks
to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to

* This Note originally appeared in Book 2, Volume 51 of the SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
REVIEW.

1. H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877);
see Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 221, 337 S.E.2d 213, 214 (1985)
("Employment at-will, a court created doctrine, was first clearly articulated in an 1877 treatise,
Masterand Servant."). See generally 1 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DIsMISSAL LAW AND
PRACTICE § 1.4, at 10 (4th ed. 1998) (providing history of the employment at-will rule).
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establish it by proof.... [A]n indefinite hiring... is
determinable at the will of either party.... 2
Wood's treatise marked a departure from the English rule that presumed a
yearly hiring for general or indefinite contracts.3 The American rule, derived
largely in response to the Industrial Revolution,4 allowed termination at any
time, for any reason, by the employer or the employee.' Many legal
commentators criticized Wood for the scant authority he cited in arriving at the
American rule,6 but the nation nevertheless embraced the doctrine.7
In 1936, South Carolina first adopted Wood's American rule in Shealy v.
Fowler. The Shealy court construed the plaintiff's employment contract as "a
contract ...
for an indefinite term [that] could be terminated at the will of either
party."9 The court found that because Mr. Shealy had a contract for an
indefinite term, he was an at-will employee and had no claim for breach of
contract."0 Since the Shealy decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court has

2. WOOD,supranote 1, § 134, at 272.
3. See PERRrrr,supra note 1, § 1.3, at 9 (quoting Blackstone's English rule, which
explained that "[i]f the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law construes
it to be a hiring for a year").
4. See id. § 1.4, at 10 ("The Industrial Revolution thus led both parties to the employment
relationship to desire greater freedom to negotiate employment terms.").
5. See, e.g., Ludwick, 287 S.C. at 221,337 S.E.2d at 214, stating:
Professor H.G. Wood... is credited with formulating the 'American Rule'
that, where an employment contract is indefinite as to its duration, the
employer may discharge employees for good cause, no cause or even cause
morally wrong
....[T]he doctrine is cast in mutuality, affording to employee as well as
employer the right of at-will termination ....
6. See PERRnTr, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 12 ("Application of Wood's version of the new
American rule was never free from criticism... .'); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at WillRule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118, 126 (1976) ("[T]he four American cases
he cited in direct support of the rule were in fact far offthe mark ....[I]n the absence of valid
legal support, Wood offered no policy grounds for the rule he proclaimed."); Kenneth T.
Lopatka, The EmergingLaw of Wrongful Discharge-A QuadrennialAssessment of the Labor
Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAw. 1,4 (1984) ("As courts and critics who would modify the
rule have pointed out, none of the four cases Wood cited in support of his formulation actually
do support it.").
7. See, e.g., STUART H. BOMPEY ETAL., WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMs: A PREVENTIVE
APPROACH3 (2d ed. 1991) (explaining that Wood's "1877 treatise on master and servantlaw was
influential in coalescing American jurisprudence around the new rule"); IC.B. LABATT, MASTER
AND SERVANT § 160, at 519 (2d ed. 1913) ("The preponderance of American authority in favor
of the doctrine that an indefinite hiring is presumptively a hiring at will is so great that it is now
scarcely open to criticism.").
8. 182 S.C. 81, 188 S.E. 499 (1936).
9. Id. at 88, 188 S.E. at 502.
10. Id.
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applied the rule in various circumstances," recognizing that employers can fire
at-will employees for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all. 2
B. Exceptions to the Employment At-Will Doctrine
While employment at-will is widely accepted across the nation, courts in
the 1980s and 1990s became increasingly concerned about the largely
unrestrained right of the employer to terminate employees at-will. Therefore,
almost every jurisdiction adopted some form of limitation to the doctrine. 3
Courts carved out three common law exceptions to give at-will employees a
remedy when their employers wrongfully terminated their employment: the
public policy exception, the implied contract theory, and the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.'4 Depending on the jurisdiction, these actions
rest in either contract or tort.1 s
First, the public policy theory allows an employee to have "a cause of
action against an employer when the termination of that employee would
contravene some explicit, well-established public policy.' 6However, as many
commentators note, pinpointing a precise definition of public policy can be
troublesome.' 7 Second, the implied contract theory modifies the at-will
relationship when "employer representations regarding the job security of
employees and/or the manner in which termination decisions are to be made are
treatedby courts as enforceable, contractual provisions, even though an express
contract is absent and employment would otherwise be at will."'" The implied
contract theory usually arises as a result of the employer's handbook or oral

11. See Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 769, 259 S.E.2d 812, 813 (1979);
Ross v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 273 S.C. 764, 765, 259 S.E.2d 814, 815 (1979); Gainey v. Coker's
Pedigreed Seed Co., 227 S.C. 200,205,87 S.E.2d 486,489 (1955); Orsini v. Trojan Steel Corp.,
219 S.C. 272, 276, 64 S.E.2d 878, 879 (1951); Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216
S.C. 536, 538, 59 S.E.2d 148, 149 (1950); Weber v. Perry, 201 S.C. 8, 12, 21 S.E.2d 193, 194
(1942).
12. See Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 309 S.C. 243, 245, 422 S.E.2d 91, 92 (1992);
Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 300 S.C. 481,484,388 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1990); Ludwick v. This
Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 221,337 S.E.2d 213, 214 (1985).
13. See generallyDavid J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful
DischargeDoctrines: Up-Date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 645 (1996)
(analyzing the exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine across the fifty states).
14. See PERRrrr,supra note 1, § 1.2, at 4-5; Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 13, at 646-47.
15. See PERRrrr,supranote 1, § 1.2, at 4 (listing the elements of each theory). Generally,
the public policy exception gives rise to a cause of action in tort while the other two theories are
based in contract. See id.
16. Walsh & Schwarz, supranote 13, at 646.
17. See Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the
Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistenciesin Application, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1583, 1593
(1994); Mark D. Wagoner, Jr., Comment, The PublicPolicyException to theEmployment at Will
Doctrine in Ohio: A Needfor a LegislativeApproach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1799, 1807 (1996).
18. Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 13, at 646-47.
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representations. 9 Finally, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
rests on the idea that "neither party to a contract should be allowed to take
actions that have the effect of denying the other party the benefits of the
contractual relationship."20 Since these are general definitions, a closer look at
any one jurisdiction may provide deviations particular to that state.
While the at-will employment doctrine is still alive and well in South
Carolina,2" the courts recognize two of the common law exceptions mentioned
above.' The first exception, similar to the implied contract theory, modifies the
at-will status of an employee by the terms contained in an employee
handbook.' Termination under these circumstances gives rise to a claim for
breach of contract.24 The second exception applies where an employee's
discharge violates a "clear mandate of public policy." Termination under
these circumstances gives rise to a claim in tort.26 However, South Carolina
does not seem to explicitly recognize the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing exception as an independent basis for a claim against an employer.
Nonetheless, the state does allow the claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing to lie when an employer alters the at-will
employment relationship by a handbook.27

19. See id. at 647.
20. Id.
21. See Prescott v. Farmers Tel. Coop., 335 SIC. 330, 516 S.E.2d 923 (1999). The court
stated:
Although this Court has recognized exceptions to employment
at-will, the doctrine remains in force in South Carolina. We find
the policy of employment at-will provides necessary flexibility
for the marketplace and is, ultimately, an incentive to economic
development. Accordingly, we affirm and adhere to the
employment at-will doctrine in South Carolina.
Id. at 335, 516 S.E.2d at 925; see also Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 224,
337 S.E.2d 216 (1985) (finding that the at-will employment doctrine is still alive in South
Carolina).
22. See Stiles v. American Gen. Life Ins. Co., 335 S.C. 222, 227, 516 S.E.2d 449, 452
(1999) (discussing the two exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine in the concurring
opinion by Justice Toal,); Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 300 S.C. 481,484,388 S.E.2d 808, 810
(1990) (establishing South Carolina handbook exception and discussing public policy
exception); C.F.W. Manning, I, Note, Public PolicyException Open to PossibleExpansion In
Employment- At-Will Situations, 48 S.C. L. Rv. 133, 134 (1996) (discussing the two
exceptions).
23. See Small, 300 S.C. at 483, 388 S.E.2d at 810.
24. Id.
25. Ludwick, 287 S.C. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
26. Id.
27. See Shelton v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 319 S.C. 81,459 S.E.2d 851 (Ct. App. 1995),
aff'd on other grounds, Shelton v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 325 S.C. 248, 481 S.E.2d 706
(1997). The court of appeals held, "[u]nder South Carolina law, there exists in every contract an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Further, we find no authoritative case law
holding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not applicable to employment
contracts that alter the employee's at-will status." Id. at 91,459 S.E.2d at 857 (citation omitted).
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Since the recognition of these exceptions in South Carolina, there have
been numerous cases defining when these exceptions are applicable. However,
concentrating on the public policy exception, it is important to explore both its
history and the courts' recent pro-plaintiff shift in attitude to understand the
ramifications of this exception on the state's current employment practices.
I. HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
A. Ludwick
Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina,Inc.,2 8 was the first case in South
Carolina to establish a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge following
an employer's discharge of an employee in violation of "a clear mandate of
public policy." In Ludwick, the plaintiff's employer demanded that plaintiff,
an at-will employee, disobey a subpoena given by the South Carolina
Employment Security Commission under threat of termination.30 The
Employment Security Commission issued the subpoena according to state law,
and there were criminal sanctions for failure to comply.' Ludwick obeyed the
subpoena, and the defendant discharged her.32 The South Carolina Supreme
Court held that "the public policy exception is invoked when an employer
requires an at-will employee, as a condition of retaining employment, to violate
the law. ' 33 Ludwick defines a clear violation of public policy as when an
employer conditions employment upon a violation of criminal law.
B. Limitation of the PublicPolicy Exception When a Statutory Remedy
is Available
34
Wary of the possible "outpouring of vexatious and frivolous litigation'
that modification of the at-will doctrine might induce, the supreme court
fashioned a very limited public policy exception in Ludwick, and the judicial

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

287 S.C. 224, 337 S.E.2d 216 (1985).
Id. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
Id. at 221,337 S.E.2d at 213-14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
Id. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216. The court explained that:
[O]ther jurisdictions which recognize the exception also
acknowledge the peril that an outpouring of vexatious and
frivolous litigation may be spawned by the modification of the
doctrine.... In sharing these same concerns we emphasize that
a cause of action for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee
shall exist only where the alleged retaliatory discharge
constitutes a clear violation of a mandate of public policy.
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decisions that followed were slow to expand its scope." Furthermore, the court
limited the applicability of the exception in Epps v. Clarendon County 6 and
Dockins v. Ingles Markets, Inc. 37 In these cases, the court decided that an atwill employee is not entitled to relief under the public policy exception if the
employee has an existing statutory remedy. 8 Justice Toal's concurrence in
Stiles v. American GeneralLifeInsuranceCompan9 explained these cases as
making it clear that "the Ludwick exception is not designed to overlap an
employee's statutory or contractual rights to challenge a discharge, but rather
to provide a remedy for a clear violation of public policy where no other
reasonable means of redress exists." 4 0
C. PublicPolicy Exception Ready for Expansion
While the courts limited the public policy exception where a statutory
remedy existed, they also began to wrestle with what constitutes a clearly
mandated public policy. Miller v. Fairfield Communities, Inc.,41 seemed to
interpret Ludwick as asserting that the public policy exception was only

35. See Miller v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 299 S.C. 23,382 S.E.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1989)
(declining to extend the public policy exception to include instances where the employee had to
choose between termination and receiving civil penalties or sanctions). The court stated:
From the discussion in Ludwick it seems clear that the Supreme
Court did not consider public policy outside the sphere of
criminal sanctions. The Supreme Court may want to consider
this question and pass upon it. We choose not to expand the
public policy exception to include the case before us.
Id. at 26-27, 382 S.E.2d at 19.
The court later explained that this decision was in accord with the decisions in both federal
and state courts. Id. As an example, the court highlighted the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
Maryland's at-will statute in Adler v. American StandardCorp., 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).
In that case the Fourth Circuit stated that "[l]imitation of the claim for abusive discharge to
situations involving the actual refusal to engage in illegal activity, or the intention to fulfill a
statutorily prescribed duty, ties abusive discharge claims down to a manageable and clear
standard." Miller at 27, 382 S.E.2d at 19 (quoting American Standard, 830 F.2d at 1307).
36. 304 S.C. 424,405 S.E.2d 386 (1991).
37. 306 S.C. 496, 413 S.E.2d 18 (1992).
38. In Epps, the court refused to expand the public policy exception where an individual
receives relief under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of constitutional rights by a
government official. See Epps, 304 S.C. at 424, 405 S.E.2d at 386. The court stated, "[w]e
decline to extend the Ludwick exception to a situation where, as here, the employee has an
existing remedy for a discharge which allegedly violates rights other than the right to the
employment itself." Id. at 426, 405 S.E.2d at 387. In Dockins,the court limited the employee's
remedy to that prescribed under the Fair Labor Standards Act and did not expand the public
policy exception. See Dockins, 307 S.C. at 496, 413 S.E.2d at 18. The court held, "w]hen a
statute creates a substantive right.., the plaintiff is limited to that statutory remedy. We hold
this applies when the right is created by federal law as well as state law." Id. at498, 413 S.E.2d
at 19 (citation omitted).
39. 335 S.C. 222, 516 S.E.2d 449 (1999).
40. Id. at 228, 516 S.E.2d at 452.
41. 299 S.C. 23, 382 S.E.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1989).
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triggered when the employee had to choose between breaking a criminal law
or retaining employment. However, Cullerv. Blue Ridge ElectricCooperative,
Inc.,42 disagreed with this interpretation and found that the exception extended
"at least to legislatively defined 'Crime Against Public Policy"'43 located in
Chapter 17 of Title 16 of the South Carolina Code. In Culleran employee sued
Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative for wrongful discharge, alleging that Blue
Ridge terminated him for refusing to contribute to a political action fund.' The
court determined that Blue Ridge did not fire him for that reason, therefore,
denying the employee any remedy in tort.4 s However, the court did say that he
wouldbe within the public policy exception if Blue Ridge had fired him for not
contributing to a political action fund, basing its reasoning on South Carolina
Code section 16-17-560, which proclaims it a "Crime Against Public Policy"
to fire any person in South Carolina for his political beliefs.'
47 further expanded the public
Garnerv. MorrisonKnudsen Corporation
policy exception in wrongful discharge situations. In Garner a pipe fitter
reported and testified about radioactive contamination and unsafe working
conditions at a nuclear facility, and the facility subsequently fired him." The
trial court dismissed the employee's public policy claim for wrongful discharge
on a 12(b)(6) motion for "failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action." ' The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed this holding, stating
that the issue was a novel one that should not be dismissed in a 12(b)(6)
action."0 In its reasoning, the court asserted "[w]hile we have applied the public
policy exception to situations where an employer requires an employee to
violate a criminal law, and situations where the reason for the employee's
termination was itself a violation of the criminal law, we have never held the
exception is limited to these situations."'" The court refused to address the
ultimate question of the applicability of the exception to the case. However, in
finding that the exception was not limited to those situations previously stated,
the Garner court expressed its openness to expansion of the exception and,
consequently, the possible further erosion of the at-will employment doctrine. 2

42. 309 S.C. 243, 422 S.E.2d 91 (1992).
43. Id. at 246, 422 S.E.2d at 93.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. See also Moshataghi v. The Citadel, 314 S.C. 316, 322, 443 S.E.2d 915, 919 (CL
App. 1994) (stating that an employer could not terminate an at-will employee for exercising
constitutional rights encompassed in S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-560 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
47. 318 S.C. 223,456 S.E.2d 907 (1995).
48. Id. at 224, 456 S.E.2d 908.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 226, 456 S.E.2d at 909.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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IV. POST-GARNER ExPANSION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

In a series of opinions following Garner,South Carolina state courts began
expanding the public policy exception. In three 1999 decisions, both the
supreme court and the court of appeals gave employees more deference by
exhibiting their willingness to entertain public policy claims in an increasing
number of circumstances. 3
A. Nolte: Surviving the 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
In Nolte v. GibbsInternational,Inc.,54 the court of appeals found a genuine
dispute of material fact sufficient to reverse the trial court's finding of summary
judgement on a wrongful discharge claim. Nolte, an accountant, was an at-will
employee who objected and refused to participate in the unethical and illegal
conduct of his employer; Gibbs International subsequently discharged him."
After his termination, Nolte brought an action for wrongful discharge, among
other claims, alleging that Gibbs International fired him for objecting and
refusing to participate in questionable business practices.5 6 Furthermore, he
claimed that his participation would have entailed breaking a number of state
and federal laws including, for example, mail fraud and falsifying tax returns.5 7
In response, his employer asserted that it terminated Nolte because Gibbs
International eliminated his position." The trial court granted summary
judgment to the employer on the wrongful discharge claim, and Nolte
appealed.59 On review, the court of appeals found that "[i]nquiry into the facts
is desirable to clarify the application of the law in this case; therefore, summary
judgment is inappropriate. Upon a full development of the facts at trial, a
violation of the public policy exception under Ludwick may be established."'6
In two prior cases, Garnerv. Morrison Knudsen Corp.6 and Keiger v.
Citgo, CoastalPetroleum,Inc.,62 the supreme court and the court of appeals,
respectively, reversed the trial courts' grants of 12(b)(6) motions dismissing
plaintiffs' wrongful discharge claims. In keeping with this trend, Nolte seems
to reinforce the hypothesis that wrongful discharge claims in the future will
survive these motions and make it to the jury. Because the "clear mandate of

53. See Stiles v. American Gen. Life Ins. Co., 335 S.C. 222,516 S.E.2d 449 (1999); Evans
v. Taylor Made Sandwich Co., 337 S.C. 95,522 S.E.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1999); Nolte v. Gibbs Int'l,
Inc., 335 S.C. 72, 515 S.E.2d 101 (CLApp. 1999).
54. 335 S.C. 72, 515 S.E.2d 101 (Ct. App. 1999).

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 73-74, 515 S.E.2d at 102.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 75, 515 S.E.2d at 102-03.
Id. at 76, 515 S.E.2d at 103.
318 S.C. 223, 456 S.E.2d 907 (1995).
326 S.C. 369,482 S.E.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1997).
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public policy" exception does not specifically define what constitutes public
policy, it is often up to the jury to make that determination.63
B. Evans: Expansion of the PublicPolicy Exceptionfor Violations of
Civil Statutory Law
The most recent decision on the public policy exception by the court of
appeals, Evans v. TaylorMade Sandwich Co.,' truly expanded the exception.
For the first time, the jury recognized a cause of action under the public policy
exception for a violation of a civil statutory law in finding for the plaintiffs.6"
The appellate court affirmed the jury's determination."
When their employer cut wages without notice, Evans and Eagleton, along
with other employees, filed a complaint with the South Carolina Department
of Labor reporting a violation of South Carolina's Payment of Wages Act.67
The employees claimed that their employer quoted them one price in a bulletin
posted on the workplace wall, a wage calculated per sandwich, but then paid
them at a lower rate, a wage calculatedperpackage." They further testified that
their employer threatened to fire employees that complained.69 One hour after
the completion of the Department ofLabor's investigation, the owner of Taylor
Made fired Evans.7" However, Taylor Made claimed the dismissal was for
excessive absenteeism. 1 Likewise, on her first day back to work after the
investigation, the owner of Taylor Made fired Eagleton.72 Again, Taylor Made
claimed the discharge occurred due to excessive absenteeism.73 Evans and
Eagleton, along with a number of co-employees, filed a complaint for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.74
The Evans court recognized that the situation was similar to the one
presented to the court in Keiger v. Citgo, CoastalPetroleum,Inc. 75 In Keiger,
the defendant employer cut a waitress's wages without notice from $5.00 per

63. Ludwick did not clearly state that public policy claims were limited by the contents of
state statutes. See Ludwiek, 287 S.C. at 219, 337 S.E.2d at 213. While courts often look to
statutes, Garnerexplicitly suggested that the courts would not limit public policy claims to the
situations defined in Ludwick. See Garner,318 S.C. 226, 456 S.E.2d at 909. Therefore, when
factual disputes arise as to the nature of the public policy exception and its expansion, South
Carolina allows the jury to participate in defining the public policy standard.
64. 337 S.C. 95, 522 S.E.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1999).
65. Id. at 102, 522 S.E.2d at 351.
66. Id. at 103, 522 S.E.2d at 351.
67. Id. at 98, 522 S.E.2d at 351.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 103, 522 S.E.2d at 352.
70. Id. at 98, 522 S.E.2d at 354.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 98-99, 522 S.E.2d at 351.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 99, 522 S.E.2d at 351.
75. 326 S.C. 369,482 S.E.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1997).
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hour to $3.50 per hour.76 Keiger called the South Carolina Department of Labor
and found out that the law required notice before an employer can reduce an
employee's wages. 7 She confronted her boss and threatened to turn him in for
violations of state (Payment of Wages Act) and federal (Fair Labor Standards
Act) laws if he did not remedy the violations." Instead of correcting the
violations, Keiger's boss fired her. 9 She filed a wrongful discharge claim that
the trial court eventually dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion." The court of appeals
found that this allegation was novel in terms of a violation of public policy and
therefore could not be dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion."t The court remanded
the case for further proceedings.8 2 The Evans court found the distinction
between these cases to be that the facts in Keigerwere not as fully developed
as the facts in Evans.
Since the facts were sufficiently developed, the Evans court looked at the
remedies available under the Payment of Wages Act. The court reasoned that
while the Act affords a remedy for the lost wages, it does not afford a remedy
for wrongful discharge.8 3 Therefore, the court found that it was up to the jury
to determine whether to expand the public policy exception to apply in this
case, reasoning "[w]hile the public policy exception applies to an employee
who is required to violate criminal law or where an employer's termination of
an employee is itself a violation of criminal law, it has never been explicitly
applied to the violation of a civil statutory law."8" The court further explained:
First, the jury had to determine whether Taylor Made
terminated Evans and Eagleton because they had filed a wage
complaint with the Department. If the jury concluded the
termination was for that reason and was therefore a retaliatory
discharge, then they were to determine if such a retaliatory
discharge violated public policy.... Having determined that
the terminations were in fact retaliatory, the jury then
obviously determined that discharging an employee on those
grounds is, and should be, a violation of the public policy of
this State.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Evans, 337 S.C. at 102, 522 S.E.2d at 353 (finding that these employees, unlike the

employees in Epps and Dockins, did not have a statutory remedy for wrongful discharge).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 103, 522 S.E.2d at 353 (citations omitted).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/13

10

2000

Galberry: Employers Beware: South Carolina's Public Policy Exception to the
EMPLOYMENT LAW

The court of appeals found that enough evidence existed to support the jury's
verdict and affirmed their decision. 6
This marks the first real tangible expansion of the public policy exception
since Culler87 and exhibits the courts' willingness to broaden the public policy
exception. Furthermore, this decision will likely prompt more wrongful
discharge cases dealing with possible violations of public policy, because it
shows that more cases are getting to the jury and that tort damages are
available.
C. Stiles: Contractswith Notice ProvisionsSubject to the PublicPolicy
Exception
While not expanding the public policy exception per se, Stiles v. American
GeneralLife Insurance Co., 8 the most recent South Carolina Supreme Court
case on the topic, expanded the number of at-will situations where an employer
may bring a wrongful discharge claim based on a public policy violation. In a
certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, the supreme court decided whether it considered an employee,
subject to a thirty day notice provision in a contract for at-will employment,
truly at-will for the purposes of the public policy exception. 9 Since courts have
traditionally considered a contract with a notice provision as employment for
a definite term,9" the supreme court had to decide whether it would go along
with tradition or recognize that this type of contract was sufficiently similar to
an at-will contract to trigger the public policy exception. 9' In keeping with its
pro-plaintiff attitude, the court decided to allow the claim of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy when a contract with a notice provision
was essentially at-will.'
InStiles, the plaintiff and his employer signed two employment agreements
containing terms that essentially made him an at-will employee. However, the
employment agreement provided for thirty days written notice before
termination.93 A few years later, the defendant exercised its power to terminate
and provided the requisite thirty days notice to the plaintiff.94 The plaintiffthen
sued the defendant in circuit court for breach of contract and wrongful
discharge. 9S The defendant removed the action to federal court, conducted

86. Id.
87. 309 S.C. 243, 422 S.E.2d 91 (1992).
88. 335 S.C. 222,516 S.E.2d 449 (1999).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 223, 516 S.E.2d at 450.
94. Id.
95. Id. Plaintiff based the wrongful discharge claim on allegations that the defendant fired
him in retaliation for reporting and protesting the employer's illegal actions. Id.
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discovery, and then moved for sunmaryjudgment as to both causes of action.96
While the court granted the motion as to the breach of contract claim, it
reversed the wrongful discharge claim in order to certify this question to the
Supreme Court of South Carolina.97
In analyzing the question, the supreme court looked at the characteristics
of both employment contracts for a definite term and at-will contracts."
Discussing employment contracts for a definite term, the court explained:
An employment contract containing a notice provision is a
contract for a definite term. An employment contract
containing a notice provision does not provide for a specific
termination date, but is continually in force until notice is
given. Once notice is given the employment contract assumes
a definite term which is the last day of the notice period. A
person hired under an employment contract for a definite
term may not be discharged before the completion of the term
without just cause. The measure of damages when an
employee is wrongfully discharged under a contract for a
definite term generally is the wages for the unexpired portion
of the term.99
Comparing employment at-will contracts to those with a definite term, Justice
Toal stated in her concurring opinion that at-will contracts differ in two ways:
"(1) there is no fixed period of time; and (2) employers can discharge
employees for good cause, no cause, or even cause that is morally wrong."' °
Thus, an employee has no remedy for termination in an at-will situation unless
he can prove one of the two exceptions: handbook modification of his at-will
status 0 ' or public policy." 2
The defendant asserted that the public policy exception was inapplicable
because an at-will employee with a contractual notice provision had a remedy
for discharge unavailable to a typical at-will employee.' °3 The defense felt that
the notice provision gave the at-will employee "a contractual remedy for
termination for cause without notice and the right to retain employment for the
notice period after receiving notice oftermination without cause."'O' The court
disagreed stating "[t]he employee with a notice provision is in the same
position as an at-will employee with the only difference being that the

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 224-25, 516 S.E.2d at 450 (Toal, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 227, 516 S.E.2d at451 (citingLudwick, 287 S.C. at 221-22,337 S.E.2d at 214).
101. See Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 300 S.C. 481,388 S.E.2d 808 (1990).
102. See Ludwick, 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985).
103. Stiles, 335 S.C. at 225, 516 S.E.2d at 451.

104. Id.
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employer is required to give the employee notice prior to terminating
employment."' 05 Finding that the extra notice was not a remedy for termination,
the court felt that employees at-will and employees at-will with notice
provisions were essentially the same in terms of the application of the public
policy exception. '0 6 Accordingly, the court extended the public policy
exception to at-will employees with a contractual notice provision, claiming
that to hold10 7 otherwise would "violate[] the spirit of the public policy
exception."'

Justice Toal went on to articulate the two goals behind Ludwick's public
policy exception: "(1) the vindication of the state's interest by prohibiting
termination in violation of the clear mandate of public policy; and (2) the
protection of at-will employees who are often without a remedy when
terminated in violation of public policy."'0 5 Justice Toal agreed with the
majority that the plaintiffs lack of an alternate remedy was the key to the
decision."° Justice Toal stated:
If an employer can avoid the possibility of damages
associated with a public policy violation by simply giving the
employee a written contract with a stated notice period before
termination, the public policy exception would become
ineffectual at achieving its policy goals .... In situations

where the only protection from termination for reasons which
violate public policy is a notice provision, the purposes
served by Ludwick cannot be achieved through any other
means than the application of the public policy exception
allowing a suit in tort.10
The Stiles court demonstrated its willingness to create new remedies for
plaintiffs where none previously existed by the extension of the public policy
exception to at-will contracts with notice provisions. In Ludwick, the court
looked to other jurisdictions before adopting the public policy exception.I'
Similarly, in Stiles, the district court provided cases from other jurisdictions
that considered this situation. However, those decisions were split, and the
supreme court did not have a clear trend to follow." 2 By extending the
application of the public policy exception when both sides presented strong

105. Id. at 226, 516 S.E.2d at 451.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 228, 516 S.E.2d at 452 (Toal, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 226, 516 S.E.2d at 451 (Toal, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 229, 516 S.E.2d at 453 (Toal, J.,
concurring).
111. See Ludwick, 287 S.C. at 222, 337 S.E.2d at 214 (listing other jurisdictions not strictly
adhering to the at-will doctrine).
112. See Stiles v. American Gen. Life Ins., 994 F. Supp. 712,715 (D.S.C. 1988).
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arguments, the court sent the message that employee's rights andprotection are
of utmost concern.
V. CONCLUSION

A new trend has developed in the past year in South Carolina courts that
signals a broadening of the public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine. This trend is evidenced through: (1) the denial of 12(b)(6) motions
resulting in more jury decisions on the exception; (2) the application of the
exception to civil statutory law as well as criminal law; and (3) the exception's
use where notice provisions are entered into an essentially at-will employment
contract. In short, South Carolina courts may hold employers liable for
wrongful discharge in more situations. This, in turn, will spawn more public
policy claims. No one can predict with certainty what the courts will do in the
future; however, if this trend continues, employers beware!
Melanie Robin Galberry
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